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This study compares the performance of foreign firms with domestic ones in 
Russia and Ukraine, using recent survey data of 450 enterprises. We find that 
foreign owned firms are less prone to inter-enterprise arrears and wage arrears, 
have a better export performance, and use more sophisticated competition 
strategies. Foreign investment appears to enhance entrepreneurial know-how. 
In case of de novo firms foreign investment often led to a ‘jump start’ of the 
enterprise, rather than a gradual adjustment over time. Foreign firms have a 
positive spill-over effect. They introduce healthy financial management 
methods, and proliferate badly needed market oriented entrepreneurial know-
how through the managerial market.  
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  1FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ENTERPRISE 
PERFORMANCE IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: EVIDENCE 




The aim of this article is to investigate the effect of foreign direct 
investment on the performance of firms in transition countries. 
Especially we look at the aspects of finance and entrepreneurship. 
Other areas of firm management that are influenced by the foreign 
capital input are investigated as well. The methodology is empirical. 
On the base of firm level survey data the performance of firms that 
have received foreign direct investment is compared with the 
performance of firms that did not receive foreign funds. The data 
come from an enterprise survey that was carried out in the second half 
of 1997 covering 450 firms in St. Petersburg, Russia, and Kiev and 
the eastern regions of Ukraine. The sample was stratified. Half of the 
enterprises are de novo firms and the other half are state owned and 
privatised enterprises. The goal of the survey was to investigate the 
effects of entrepreneurship on firm performance. Consequently no 
specific sample stratification with respect to foreign ownership was 
adopted. Given the stratification with respect to firm type the selection 
of the number of firms with foreign direct investment can be 
considered random. The sub-sample of firms with foreign direct 
investment (FDI) comprises 34 firms.  
 
Quite a few studies emphasise the positive effects of foreign direct 
investment on the performance of the firm. FDI fulfils the need for 
long-term investment capital (see for example Sudol, 1993; Carlin et 
al, 1994). Capital markets in the CIS countries are in their infancy. 
Long-term loans are virtually non-existent, and stock market flotation 
is not a feasible option for all firms (EBRD, 1998). In this 
environment receiving FDI might make the difference between 
survival and exit. FDI might be an important means to bridge the 
financial constraints faced by the entrepreneur. Evidence from central 
  1European firms showed that FDI was usually accompanied by 
substantial investment and updating of the production process (Carlin 
et al, 1994; Dabrowski, 1995).  
 
FDI was also found to be an important vehicle for the transfer of 
technology (see for example Borensztein et al, 1995). Introducing new 
technology often requires substantial sums of money as well as access 
to sources of know-how. Given the immature state of the capital 
market in transition countries and the different technological 
development path compared to the West it is a major challenge to 
obtain both technological know-how and the financing of the 
investment, in which it is embodied, in the local market (Bilsen and 
Lagae, 1997). It was also found that firms receiving FDI had a better 
export performance and especially an easier access to established 
market economies (EBRD, 1998).  
 
One expects that a better access to investment funds and technology 
will be reflected in a higher productivity outcome. Recently, Aitkin 
and Harrison (1999) found that in the case of Venezuela FDI is 
positively related to productivity in small enterprises but that the 
effect was not significant for large firms. Djankov and Hoekman 
(1998) investigated the effect of FDI on productivity for medium 
sized and large firms in the Czech Republic. They concluded that FDI 
did not have a significant positive impact and that firms without FDI 
were apparently able to catch up with the latest technology through 
other channels, in particular trade.  
 
Drawing lessons from these studies it is argued that FDI provides 
long-term investment capital, stimulates the transfer of technology, 
increases productivity and promotes export to established market 
economies. The evidence also suggests that the productivity effects of 
FDI are particularly important for small firms.  
 
Other studies suggest an indirect route through which FDI influences 
firm performance, namely spill-over effects. Looking at evidence 
  2from new industrialised countries, Markusen and Venables (1997) 
found that FDI leads to increased competition for the local firms on 
the output and factor markets, resulting in a reduction of profits. Yet 
supply linkages for complementary industries may lead to the 
establishment of local industrial sectors. Gow and Swinnen (1998) 
found empirical evidence that FDI spurred the restructuring of 
agricultural output markets in transition countries leading to strong 
output, yield and investment responses within sectors and across 
adjacent sectors. Aitkin and Harrison (1999) found for Venezuelan 
manufacturing firms that FDI negatively influences the productivity 
of the indigenous firms. Contrary to that, Blomström and Sjöholm 
(1999) concluded for Indonesian enterprises that foreign firms had a 
positive spill-over effect on the labour productivity of domestic firms.  
 
Almost all the empirical evidence cited above is based on evidence 
from established (Western) market economies and Central European 
transition countries. There is still a considerable gap to be filled in 
knowledge of the effects of foreign direct investment on firm 
performance in the CIS countries. On the one hand one might argue 
that what works in the Central European transition countries works as 
well for the CIS countries. From this perspective the same results are 
expected as the ones cited above. On the other hand there are 
considerable differences between the Central European countries and 
the CIS countries. Not the least to mention is the different pace of 
transition towards a market economy (EBRD, 1998). 
 
Another important difference is the history of these countries and its 
impact on the entrepreneurial spirit. The CIS countries were more 
than seventy years under rigid communist planning, coming from a 
mainly agrarian economy with little experience in market type firm 
management and entrepreneurship. It is questionable whether a Euro 
invested in this type of environment generates the same type of 
entrepreneurial spin-offs as in the Central European transition 
countries. Even under communist planning there were more 
opportunities for small-scale entrepreneurship in, for example, 
  3Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia than in the countries of the Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, parents or grandparents could witness from a 
starting industrial market economy before the Second World War.  
 
An aspect in which we are particular interested in and which received 
little attention in the debate is the relation ship between 
entrepreneurship and management. Borensztein et al. (1995) argue 
that a condition for an FDI related technology transfer to result in 
higher productivity is that the host country has a minimum threshold 
stock of human capital. This suggests that entrepreneurial know-how 
is an important factor in the explanation of the results of FDI on 
company performance. Case study evidence suggests that FDI was 
often accompanied by a transfer in managerial know-how (Bilsen and 
Lagae, 1997). However more systematic evidence for transition 
countries is lacking to our current knowledge.  
 
The methodology to uncover the effect of foreign investment on the 
growth and performance of enterprises in the CIS countries is 
basically empirical. In the sample of 450 firms from St. Petersburg, 
Kiev and the east Ukrainian region that were surveyed, we found 34 
firms that received FDI. Since there was no specific stratification of 
the firms with respect to foreign ownership, the selection of firms 
with FDI can be considered as random within the strata of pre-
transition firms and de novo firms. They come from the same 
population of firms. The performance of the group of firms with FDI 
was compared with the performance of the firms without FDI, which 
acted as the control group. For obvious reasons there is no foreign 
investment in state owned enterprises, leaving two remaining firm 
types, privatised and de novo firms.  
 
The main findings are that firms that received FDI were less prone to 
inter-enterprise arrears and wage arrears. Foreign firms were found to 
have a better export performance, and to use more sophisticated 
competition strategies and better management practices. In case of de 
novo firms foreign investment often led to a ‘jump start’ of the 
  4enterprise, rather than a gradual adjustment over time. This suggests 
that FDI does indeed transfer managerial and technological know-how 
to the former CIS countries. Human capital played an important role 
in the attraction of the foreign capital. A basic condition for obtaining 
FDI is in many cases a minimum entrepreneurial know-how necessary 
to make the venture work. Additionally FDI stimulates the 
entrepreneurs of the foreign owned firms to increase and update their 
entrepreneurial human capital through self-study and courses. Two 
positive spill-over effects of FDI were found. First, depending on the 
supply linkages with the domestic firms, foreign enterprises might 
help to reduce the inter-enterprise debt cycle. Second, our results 
suggest that an important part of the knowledge transfer to the 
domestic firms goes through the managerial labour market.  
 
In the next section we briefly present the sample and its properties on 
which the analysis is based. Subsequently we take a close look at the 
firms that received foreign investment funds. In the following section 
the performance of the firms with FDI is compared with the firms that 
received no foreign funds. The last section draws the various findings 
together and concludes.  
 
2. The Survey Data and Survey Environment 
 
The data that we use come from a survey carried out as a part of the 
above mentioned TACIS-ACE funded research network. The goal of 
that survey was to investigate the determinants of firm growth and 
particularly the effect of entrepreneurship in de novo firms and in 
state owned and privatised enterprises. The survey was designed with 
this goal in mind. Within that framework aspects of FDI were 
investigated as well. In total 450 firms were surveyed equally 
distributed over three different regions: Kiev, East-Ukraine and St. 
Petersburg. Within each region the sample was stratified according to 
50% de novo firms and 50% traditional firms, being state owned and 
privatised firms. The traditional firms were selected from the 
manufacturing sector only. De novo firms were selected from 
  5manufacturing, trade and services. No other sample limitations were 
implied other than those referred to. The interviews for Ukraine were 
conducted in summer 1997 and those for Russia in winter 1997
1. On 
average the interviews lasted for about one to two hours. Apart from 
basic aspects for the identification of the firm, the questionnaire 
covered entrepreneurship and finance as well as competition, 
employment issues and production. For a more detailed description of 
the questionnaire we refer to Bilsen and Mitina, (1998).  
 
The regions from which we sampled can be labelled as core regions of 
Ukraine and Russia. St. Petersburg is one of the major economic 
centres of Russia. In 1997 it came second in attracting FDI after 
Moscow
2. Together with Moscow it contains the highest educated 
population among all Russian regions (Brock, 1998). Kiev is the 
capital of Ukraine, hosting 5% of the Ukrainian population and 
accounting for 40% of all FDI up to January 1998 in Ukraine
3. The 
East Ukrainian region comprises the cities of Dnepropetrovsk, 
Donetsk, Kharkiv, Lugansk, and Zaporizhzhya. It contains 33% of the 
Ukrainian population and attracted 19% of all FDI into Ukraine. The 
East Ukrainian region is known for its concentration of heavy industry 
and was during the pre-transition period part of the industrial heart of 
the Soviet Union. Table 1 gives an overview of the firms in the 
sample by region, firm type and size.  
 
Table 1 shows clearly the sample set-up and stratification across de 
novo firms and the other enterprises. After having received more 
detailed information about the ownership structure and the history of 
the firm through the questionnaire a number of firms were reallocated 
to another firm type group, which explains the difference from the 
original stratification. The average size of de novo firms is 
substantially smaller than that for the other types of firms, a finding 
that is consistent with that of other studies (e.g. Bilsen and Konings, 
1998). They are mostly small enterprises while the privatised and state 
owned firms are mostly medium sized and large enterprises. The 
sampled firms in Russia were on average larger than those in Ukraine. 
  6The biggest de novo firm in the St. Petersburg sample was a 
subsidiary of a well-known Western company producing elevators, 
supplying mainly the CIS market. The largest enterprise in East 
Ukraine operates in the agricultural processing industry. The one in 
St. Petersburg produces tractors and steel products. The small 
enterprises in the group of state-owned firms are owned by 
municipalities, and were as such classified as state-owned. The small 
privatised enterprises resulted from split-ups of previously state-
owned enterprises in the course of the privatisation process.  
 
3. The Firms with Foreign Direct Investment: Description and 
Distribution 
 
We inquired about the ownership structure of the company at the 
moment of the interview as well as the previous ownership 
composition. Respondents were asked to list the percentage of the 
total assets owned by particular types of owner of which one option 
stated “private investors outside the country”. FDI-firms were defined 
as firms where the outside investors had a positive share in the 
ownership structure
4. Table 2 gives an overview of the firms that 
received foreign capital investment by country.  
 
Table 2 shows that a somewhat higher percentage of FDI-firms were 
sampled in Ukraine than in Russia, namely 9% versus 5% of the 
respective samples. This does not necessarily mean that Ukraine is 
more successful in attracting investment projects than Russia. 
Looking at the location of the firms in Ukraine we find that 17 of the 
26 FDI-firms are located in Kiev. To the degree that FDI tends to be 
located in the capital areas, the figure for Russia might be 
underrepresented.  
 
The average share of foreign investment is higher for the Russian 
sample than for the Ukrainian. This could mean that foreign investors 
are more reluctant to invest in Ukraine than in Russia. Yet other 
explanatory factors such as the legal background and the type of 
  7foreign direct investment are equally valid candidates for explanation. 
For both countries the share of the foreign investor increased over 
time compared to the share in the start-up capital. This can be 
interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation is that the foreign 
investors try to gain control over the business. A second interpretation 
is that the foreign investor fulfils the need for capital that only can be 
obtained at costlier terms on the local market.  
 
Another observation is that the average size of the FDI-firms in 
Russia is significantly bigger than in the Ukrainian sample. Part of the 
puzzle on the size differences can be solved by looking at the 
distribution of FDI-firms by firm type. Table 3 shows that in the 
Ukrainian sample far more de novo firms received foreign investment 
than privatised firms, while for the Russian sample the reverse holds. 
De novo firms have on average a significant smaller size than 
privatised firms, as noted above. Hence the lower is the average 
employment size. Note that the higher frequency of de novo FDI-
firms in the Ukrainian sample also helps to explain why more 
Ukrainian FDI-firms in our sample concentrate on trade and services.  
 
Why does the Russian sample show relatively more foreign capital 
investment through the privatised firms than the Ukrainian sample? 
Although one has to bear in mind that the sample is relatively small to 
reflect fully the underlying population distributions, the different 
privatisation progress in both countries might explain part of the 
picture. By 1997, the year of the interviews, Russia had showed more 
progress in privatising firms than Ukraine (EBRD, 1998, p26).  
 
An interesting question is in which branches do the firms operate that 
receive foreign capital funds? It reveals part of the purpose of the 
investment and consequently sheds more light on potential effects 
within the enterprise. Table 4 shows the distribution of FDI-firms by 
sector and country. Almost half of the FDI-firms were sampled from 
the manufacturing sector. This is consistent with the sectoral 
distribution of the sample in which the FDI-firms were found
5.  
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concentration of 8 firms in one particular manufacturing industry, 
namely food and beverages. The other manufacturing firms were 
operating in a broad range of markets, including furniture, cosmetics, 
gas analysers, TV programmes and telecommunications apparatus. 
Four firms were engaged in metal manufacturing. The two Ukrainian 
firms with another branch than the ones specified on the questionnaire 
operated in construction and research. Studies investigating the 
sectoral distribution of FDI in central European countries find as well 
a relative importance of FDI-firms in the food and beverages industry 
(Bilsen and Lagae, 1997; Meyer, 1995a,b). Often a major motivation 
for this industry to be present in the transition countries is the 
distribution of its products to the domestic markets.  
 
To conclude this section we look at the distribution of FDI-firms over 
the type of foreign investment. Following the OECD (1994), five 
types of FDI are distinguished. Greenfield investments were defined 
as enterprises that were started up by foreign investors and where the 
start-up was completely financed by the foreign owner. The 
information came from two questions. One asked how the business 
was started. The other question inquired about the various sources for 
financing the start-up of the enterprise. Joint ventures were defined as 
firms that were started up by the foreign investor and/or the domestic 
partner and with a foreign ownership share in the start-up capital of 
less than 100%. The information was derived from the same questions 
as for the greenfield investments. Acquisitions were defined as firms 
wholly or partly in the hands of foreign investors at the moment of the 
interview, but with no participation in the start-up of the enterprise. 
Within the group of joint ventures a distinction was made between the 
joint ventures involving the creation of a new firm and joint ventures 
with existing enterprises, which can be either private or privatised. 
The group of acquisitions was divided between majority and minority 
acquisitions. Table 5 exhibits the types with the respective number of 
firms and the average foreign participation within the group.  
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form of joint ventures for which a new firm was created. This is in 
marked contrast to the number of joint ventures with existing firms. 
This might point to substantial benefits from creating a new firm 
rather than developing the venture within the framework of an 
existing firm. For instance in the case of the introduction of a new 
product or service that was not present before transition. This finding 
is in line with the previous findings of Genco et al (1993). They 
conclude that one of the major benefits for the foreign investor of 
starting new firms is avoiding the inheritance of “antiquated 
management and production structures”.  
 
Another striking feature of the sampled FDI-firms is the relatively low 
number of greenfield investments. In central European transition 
countries like Poland this is one of the most preferred forms of foreign 
investment (Bilsen and Lagae, 1997). An obvious reason for choosing 
a greenfield investment over a joint venture is the control of the firm. 
Yet a greenfield investment requires a certain market transparency in 
the sense that a foreign owner has to be able to make his investment 
pay-off in that new location. When there is a high degree of locality 
specific knowledge and/or tacit knowledge, a joint venture might be a 
better form of investment. The relatively large share of joint ventures 
together with the relatively low number of greenfield investments 
points to gains connected with the nature of the local transition 
market.  
 
A last remarkable characteristic of the FDI distribution by form is the 
relatively large share of minority acquisitions. We could not find a 
clear indication for the reason, other than the traditional motives for 
FDI. Eight out of the ten minority acquisitions are acquisitions of 
privatised firms. In two of these firms the foreign investor participated 
in the privatisation process, of which one was through voucher 
privatisation. The remaining six privatised firms received foreign 
investment after the privatisation was done. Two minority acquisitions 
were acquisitions of de novo firms.  
  104. Performance Differences between FDI-firms and Non-FDI 
Firms 
 
In the following section, we try to find evidence whether or not firms 
with FDI perform differently from firms without FDI and if so, why? 
For a set of performance indicators and characteristics we conduct a 
traditional t-test. The H0 hypothesis is that the average for the FDI-
firms is the same as that for the non FDI-firms. Though we have to be 
careful not to draw hasty conclusions, these tests can be very useful in 
discerning the channels through which FDI affects firm performance.  
 
4.1. Financial performance 
 
A first obvious success indicator to look at is financial performance. 
In our survey financial performance was measured by five questions, 
which each highlight another aspect of the financial situation of an 
enterprise. We inquired whether the firm experienced financial 
difficulties and we asked the respondent to tick the year in which it 
happened, starting from 1989 until 1997. The proportion of firms that 
reported financial difficulties in each of the groups was not 
significantly different. Yet in the later years a significantly lower 
proportion of FDI-firms reported financial difficulties (see table 6). 
 
Another indication of financial performance was captured by the 
question on the liability structure of the firm. We asked respondents to 
provide the percentage of all liabilities that were regular and overdue 
according to the type of creditor. The overdue liabilities were further 
divided according to length. Table 7 shows that FDI firms have on 
average a significantly higher share of regular liabilities to firms and 
employees. In their payment relations with the banks and the budget 
we did not find a significant difference with the behaviour of the 
control group, although the average share of regular liabilities was 
slightly higher for FDI-firms.  
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payments to the firms and employees than indigenous firms? We 
inquired about the structure of the receivables in the same format as 
for the liabilities. Table 8 shows that enterprises that receive FDI have 
a significant higher share of regular receivables from firms. Together 
with the evidence on liabilities this suggests that in their inter-firm 
payment relations FDI-firms rely less on inter-enterprise credits and 
they are able to obtain from their customers more regular payments. 
Although not statistically significant, the average share of regular 
receivables from households and banks is markedly higher for the 




Looking at the income side of the firm’s finance, we also investigated 
the average number of days that the payments were delayed. Here as 
well statistically significant differences between firms with and 
without FDI can be found as showed in table 9. Firms that receive 
FDI have on average less than half of the delay in payments period 
compared with firms that do not receive FDI.  
 
The last aspect of financial performance that we investigated was the 
profitability of the firm. We asked “ Did the profitability of your 
company since last year: 1. Go down, 2. Remain the same, 3. Go up?” 
We did not find statistically significant differences in the evolution of 
profitability since the year before the interviews. 41% of the firms 
with FDI reported a deterioration of their profits in 1997 compared to 
1996 against 51% of the firms in the control group. Yet the averages 
are not different at a statistically significant level.  
 
To conclude on the financial performance we found that the firms that 
received FDI have on average a better liability structure than 
enterprises without FDI. Especially in the field of inter-enterprise 
arrears and wage arrears they score significantly better. On the one 
hand one might perceive this as an obvious result of the foreign 
capital injection. The foreign investor provides the necessary finance 
  12for a smooth start and operation in the first years of operation. Yet on 
the other hand other aspects seem to drive this result as well. FDI-
firms perform better on the side of receivables. Especially for 
receivables coming from firms the performance of FDI-firms is 
markedly better. Furthermore the average delay in payments in terms 
of days for the FDI-firms is more than half that for the non-FDI firms.  
 
4.2. Financial management views 
 
The subsequent question that arises is then: why is financial 
performance better for FDI-firms than for non-FDI firms? We gave 
the opportunity to the respondents to answer this question. We asked 
them to rank the most important reasons for the accumulation of the 
overdue liabilities and to give a single rank. The list of options 
included overdue receivables, expensive bank credit, it is a normal 
practice, wages come first, serving bank credit comes first, taxes come 
first, absences of resources on the current account, sales are too low, 
no overdue payments and others. Looking at the average values of the 
rankings, non-FDI firms listed overdue receivables as the most 
important reason, followed by taxes and subsequently wages
7. FDI-
firms listed “taxes come first” as the most important reason, and 
subsequently overdue receivables and wages (see table 10).  
 
Note that 52% of the FDI-firms pointed to overdue receivables as the 
most important reason, compared to 57% for the control group. 
Furthermore, a higher proportion of FDI-firms gave low rankings in 
the range from 3 to 9. There was less variance in the non-FDI group 
about overdue receivables being a major cause for overdue liabilities 
than in the FDI-group. 
 
This result is consistent with the previous result that FDI-firms have a 
higher share of regular receivables than non-FDI firms, which in turn 
leads to less overdue liabilities. The finding that taxes are a more 
important reason than overdue receivables and wages for the FDI 
firms to explain their overdue liabilities might indicate that these firms 
  13find it difficult to predict or incorporate the impact of the tax 
legislation on the financial situation.  
 
Another difference is that although wages are in both groups the third 
most important reason for overdue liabilities, FDI-firms give a 
significant lower value for it than the control group. FDI-firms 
perceive to a lesser degree that the wage bill is an important reason for 
overdue liabilities.  
 
This evidence points to another question, what are the payment 
priorities of the firm? We inquired about the liabilities of the firm 
according to its priority. Four options were listed ranging from 1, 
most urgent payment to 4, least urgent payment. Table 11 gives an 
overview of the results.  
 
FDI-firms do not differ in their payment priorities compared to the 
non-FDI firms. Both give highest priority to paying taxes, followed by 
payments to firms, wages and the lowest priority the banks. However 
the average priority for the liabilities to the employees differ 
significantly between both groups, with FDI-firms giving a lower 
average priority than the control group, which is consistent with both 
the results on the reasons and the actual pattern of liabilities.  
 
We also asked how do you keep your overdue receivables under 
control? The answers on this question did not give any decisive 
difference between FDI and non-FDI firms. Neither did the question 
on filing for insolvency of the client. This suggests that the better 
financial position on the receivables side is not so much driven by 
different financial management strategies, as least insofar the potential 
differences could be captured by the questionnaire. In the next 
sections we investigate the sales and market, production and 
technology, and entrepreneurial characteristics.  
 
  144.3. Sales and export performance 
 
We compared the export performance of the FDI-firms with that of 
the control group in terms of the share of total sales on the foreign 
market for three years, 1990, 1994 and 1996. The results are presented 
in table 12.  
 
Table 12 clearly shows that FDI-firms have a significantly higher 
share of their total sales coming from foreign markets than firms in 
the control group. This aligns with the evidence found in the central 
European transition countries (EBRD, 1998). The question arises why 
do they export more? Note that this question is related to the 
motivation of FDI. Is it cheap factors of production that make 
multinational firms invest in these countries in order to be ahead of 
competition on the global market? Or is it the size of the Ukrainian 
and Russian market that attracts foreign investment? In the first case 
one should indeed expect a high export share. In the second case, 
sales in the home country would be more important.  
 
We investigated the market orientation of the firms by asking in 
which market the majority of the products and services were sold and 
gave the following options: 1. Local, 2. Regional in the meaning of 
oblast, 3. National, 4. The CIS market and 5. International. The results 
are shown in table 13. It is clear that FDI-firms are oriented to 
international markets while firms in the control group sell more in the 
local market. Interestingly though, FDI-firms operate equally strongly 
on the national and CIS’ markets, contrary to the non-FDI firms. It is 
worthwhile noting that although the export share in FDI-firms is 
significantly larger than for non-FDI firms, still around 80% of the 
output is sold on the domestic market, which is in line with the 
evidence on the market orientation.  
 
  154.4. Technology, investment and productivity 
 
We asked, “did the company make an investment in new production 
equipment and machines since 1989 or start-up?” The question also 
inquired about the year in which the investment was made. Contrary 
to the conclusions of other studies on the effects of FDI in central 
European countries, we did not find a significant difference in 
investment performance between FDI and non-FDI firms. We 
deepened the analysis and investigated the investment performance 
for de novo and privatised firms separately. The same result appeared 
for privatised firms. However de novo FDI-firms invested 
significantly less than non-FDI de novo firms, as shown in table 14. 
This counter intuitive result might indicate that for de novo FDI-firms 
the investment in equipment and machines is made at the start of the 
enterprise, as a sunk cost, providing enough capacity for the first 
years of operation. This would imply that there is no need for new 
investments in the early years of operation for these firms. Since the 
question inquired about investments since start-up, the investments at 
or before the start of the enterprise are not captured by this question.  
 
The results on the privatised firms are consonant with the findings of 
the literature. The proportion of privatised firms that made 
investments during the course of the transition period was higher for 
those that received FDI than for those that did not.  
 
We also investigated the age composition of equipment and machines. 
FDI firms had on average a higher share of equipment aged 2 to 8 
years compared to non-FDI firms: respectively 58% and 49%. On 
average 21% of FDI-firms’ equipment had an age between 9 and 25 
years old compared to 30% of the non-FDI firms. Although the 
proportions are not statistically significantly different at the 5% level, 
they suggest that FDI-firms tend to operate with more recent 
technology than non-FDI firms. This supports the hypothesis of 
Borensztein et al. (1995) that FDI is a vehicle for technology transfer, 
and extends this result to the CIS countries.  
  16 
We inquired about the change of productivity in the last two years 
before the interview. The respondents were asked to indicate whether 
productivity had declined, remained constant or increased since 1995. 
We did not find any statistically significant difference in the evolution 
of productivity between the foreign and indigenous firms. This 
suggests that whether one experienced an increase, status quo or 
decline in productivity did not systematically depend on receiving 
foreign capital or not. The result was robust controlling for firm type. 
Since de novo firms are mostly small or micro firms and privatised 
firms medium sized or big (see table 1), this result indicates that there 
is no difference according to size class.  
 
The respondents were also asked to indicate whether their firm’s 
productivity was higher, the same, or lower than the average 
productivity of the other firms in their sector. Within the group of de 
novo firms 39% of the foreign firms indicated that they did better than 
average, compared to 32% of the indigenous firms. Within the group 
of privatised enterprises 36% answered that they had a higher than 
average productivity compared to 26% of the indigenous firms. 
However these differences are not statistically significant at the 5% 
rejection level rendering these results only weak evidence in favour of 
FDI.  
 
4.5. New products and R&D 
 
Given the evidence on technology and investment, the question arises 
whether the technology transfer propels into an innovating strategy or 
not. We asked “how many people are involved with research and 
product innovation?” Excluding the state firms from our control 
group, we found that both foreign de novo firms and privatised firms 
have on average a higher number of people who are involved with 
R&D.  
 
  17We did not find significant differences between FDI and non-FDI 
firms on the introduction (or sale) of new products and services 
during the early transition period. An equal share of 56% for both the 
FDI and non-FDI groups introduced new products and services in the 
period 1990-1993. However for later years of the transition, a slightly 
lower percentage of the FDI firms introduced new products, 61% for 
FDI firms compared to 74% for non-FDI firms. Controlling for firm 
types, the results are clearer. Table 16 shows that within the group of 
privatised firms the introduction of new products and services does 
not differ so much between the two groups of firms. Contrary to what 
one might expect, a lower proportion of the de novo FDI firms 
introduced new products and services in the period 1994-1997. Again, 
one could argue that they started with the right set of products and 
services from the beginning and consequently the need to introduce 
new ones would be less.  
 
4.6. Entrepreneurial strategies and background 
 
We inquired about the sales strategy of the firm. Respondents were 
asked to give a ranking of a set of given aspects according to the 
importance for the firm. The items listed were: low price, high product 
quality, fast delivery, providing seller’s credit, sales location, 
reputation, after sales support and “other”. The most significant 
differences were for after sales support and low price (see table 17). 
On average non-FDI firms gave a higher priority to low price than 
FDI-firms. FDI-firms in contrast gave on average a higher ranking to 
after sales support. Note that both types of firms gave the highest 
ranking to high product quality.  
 
The evidence on the marketing mix suggests that FDI and non-FDI 
firms compete in a different way. While non-FDI firms tend to 
compete with the ‘classical’ instruments of price and quality, FDI-
firms extend their competition instruments to after sales support. 
Thereby they sell more than the product alone, adding the use, repair 
and follow-up as well. Basically they offer in that way a different 
  18product from their competitors and at the same time stay in close 
contact with the market’s wants.  
 
Why do the FDI-firms tend to have a more sophisticated marketing 
strategy than non-FDI firms? Factors that might explain the result are 
experience and background as well as learning from the foreign firm. 
On average the entrepreneurs in FDI-firms have less private 
management experience, as shown in table 18. At the same time they 
tend to be younger than their colleagues in the control group.  
 
This suggests that experience as such is not the decisive key factor 
that makes FDI-firm management different from non-FDI firm 
management. We deepened the analysis further and investigated the 
management background of the entrepreneurs and especially whether 
they had any experience from working in a foreign firm. We asked, 
“what was the management background of you and your colleagues in 
the key management team?” One option listed “worked in a foreign 
company”. Table 19 shows the results for the respondents and for 
their colleagues of the management team. There were 4 FDI-firms 
where the respondent worked in a foreign firm and 5 enterprises 
where the other members of the management team had foreign firm 
experience. There was one firm where both the respondent and his 
colleagues worked in a foreign firm before, making the total of FDI-
firms where the management had foreign company experience equal 
to 8 out of 34 cases or 24% of the FDI sub-sample.  
 
Table 19 clearly shows that the proportion of firms with management 
experience in a foreign company is lower for the group of non-FDI 
firms than for the FDI-firms. Relating this piece of evidence to the 
more elaborate competition strategy of the FDI-firms suggests that the 
experience of working in a foreign company is an important factor in 
explaining the relative successes of FDI-firms.  
 
We also explicitly inquired about the sources of entrepreneurial 
learning by asking from what source the respondent learned most for 
  19operating his business. The average values for each type of learning 
source are presented in table 20. Self-study from books and courses 
receives the highest rank for both FDI and non-FDI firms. However, 
FDI-firms give it on average a higher ranking than non-FDI firms. 
The opposite is true for the experience from the previous job. 
Although both types of firms rank it as the second most important, 
non-FDI firms gave a significantly higher ranking than FDI-firms. For 
other sources of learning no systematic difference was found.  
 
4.7. Entrepreneurial goals and problems 
 
The last important part of the empirical investigation looks at the 
goals that the entrepreneur wants to achieve with respect to his firm. 
We inquired about the management objectives that were considered as 
most important for the firm. Table 21 shows the proportion of firms 
within each sub-sample that marked a particular objective as most 
important.  
 
It is clear from table 21 that a lower proportion of FDI-firms are 
focussed on increasing profits, finding extra investment capital and 
introducing new technology. To conclude that these aspects are not an 
issue for FDI-firms might be a bit too hasty. It might be that these 
areas of firm management are fulfilled in a large part of the FDI-firms 
and consequently might not be an important management objective. 
Note that a slightly higher percentage of the FDI-firms have the 
objective of finding well trained managers, yet this percentage is not 
significantly different from that of the control group.  
 
What are the most important problem areas in realising one’s business 
plan? What prevents the above mentioned goals from being realised? 
We asked about the most difficult aspects in realising one’s 
entrepreneurial ideas. It is striking, yet not surprising, that FDI-firms 
have significantly less difficulties in finding capital. This is consonant 
with previous evidence on financial performance. Almost half of the 
FDI-firms cite the contact with the authorities as difficult compared to 
  20only one third of the control group. Similar evidence was found from 
surveys in central European countries (OECD, 1994).  
 
A lower proportion of FDI-firms tended to have difficulties in finding 
an appropriate place, building or land, in developing a good business 
plan and in pursuing other people about the profitability of their ideas. 
More FDI-firms reported having difficulties with finding qualified 
and skilled personnel than non-FDI firms. However these aspects are 
not statistically conclusive.  
 
5. Putting the Pieces Together 
 
The goal of this article was to investigate the effect of FDI on 
enterprise performance in the CIS countries. We used new empirical 
evidence coming from a survey of 450 firms in East-Ukraine, Kiev 
and St. Petersburg, carried out in 1997. Within that sample 34 firms 
were identified that received FDI. Their identification can be 
considered as random within the sample stratification of the mother 
sample. We sampled firms in manufacturing, trade and services. The 
sampling approach also implied that in contrast with most FDI studies 
on central and east European countries that look usually to the major 
foreign investments beyond a certain size cut-off level, we selected 
from the fast growing small sized new private firms as well. More 
than half of the foreign firms were located in Kiev. The Ukrainian 
sample differed from the Russian in the sense that for Ukraine almost 
two thirds of the FDI-firms were de novo firms while for Russia the 
opposite was the case. Russian FDI was mostly located in large 
privatised firms.  
 
Contrary to evidence for central European countries we found only a 
small number of greenfield investments in the region. One third of the 
FDI-firms were in the form of joint ventures whereby a new firm was 
created. This is consistent with the finding from studies on central 
European countries that one of the major benefits of starting a new 
firm is to avoid the inheritance of old unsuited management and 
  21production structures. The only difference in our sample compared to 
studies from the central European countries is that the form of setting 
up of new enterprises differs. In central European countries foreign 
investors tend to set up new firms more through greenfield 
investments, while in our sample it happened more through joint 
ventures. Two explanations for this phenomenon can be found. First 
the Land Code in Ukraine did not allow foreigners to own land, not 
even for legitimate business purposes (OECD, 1997). This creates a 
considerable problem in setting up greenfield investments, which by 
definition are fully foreign owned. Second, given the Land Code, 
foreign investors might nevertheless prefer a joint venture with a local 
participant because of his tacit knowledge about the local 
entrepreneurial culture and the local market conditions.  
 
The latter explanation also sheds light on another interesting finding. 
Almost one third of the foreign investments took the form of a 
minority acquisition. From the point of view of control, one would 
expect a majority ownership. It provides a better control on the 
allocation of the profit and on the firm management and its 
performance. Trust in the local management team combined with their 
necessary know-how about the local market conditions and business 
culture seems to us important to explain this finding.  
 
Several performance indicators were investigated such as financial 
performance, export performance, technology and innovation. We 
found strong evidence that FDI-firms have on average a better term 
structure of their liabilities compared to non-FDI firms, especially for 
liabilities to firms and wage arrears. Note that by paying wages more 
regularly, foreign owned firms implicitly provide higher expected 
wages than indigenous firms. We also perceived that FDI-firms 
perform significantly better on receiving regular payments, especially 
from firms. This suggests that FDI-firms are more able to stay out of 
the circle of inter-enterprise arrears and that their financial situation is 
healthier than that of the domestic firms. This was also confirmed by 
the differences in management objectives. The need for finding 
  22investment capital and for improving profits was significantly lower 
ranked in foreign firms than in domestic ones.  
 
Ickes and Gaddy (1998), investigating restructuring in Russian 
enterprises, recently argued that the large amount of inter-enterprise 
arrears and overdue wage payments was part of a deliberate 
management strategy to demonetise the operation of the firm in order 
to avoid excessive taxation and rent seeking from organised crime. In 
their view the lack of employment reduction was ‘financed’ by wage 
arrears. Our findings add to this discussion that FDI-firms are 
evidently less prone to this type of management behaviour and 
consequently introduce healthy management practices in their 
respective industries. To the degree that the foreign firm uses 
domestic resources and intermediate supplies they help to reduce the 
spread of inter-enterprise debt.  
 
FDI-firms tend also to sell a markedly larger part of their production 
on the export market than non-FDI firms do. Yet they are also more 
oriented towards the host country or oblast, contrary to the non-FDI 
firms, which are mostly focussed on local markets. Contrary to what 
other studies on central European transition countries concluded, we 
did not find that FDI makes a difference in investment behaviour for 
privatised companies. Furthermore it was even perceived that in 
comparison to the control group, a lower proportion of de novo firms 
that received FDI made investment during their course of operation.  
 
Similar evidence was found for the introduction of new products and 
services in the second half of the transition period. In comparison to 
the de novo firms in the control group a lower proportion of de novo 
FDI-firms introduced new products and services. These elements 
suggest that FDI resulting in the start-up of a new firm gets the 
company in shape right from the beginning rather than going through 
subsequent adjustments and adaptation.  
 
  23On average foreign firms worked with more recent equipment and 
machines than domestic firms, indicating that FDI does indeed update 
the production technology as suggested by Borensztein et al (1995). 
However the differences were not statistically significant, preventing 
us from putting too much emphasis on this result.  
 
We did not find any statistically significant differences in the 
evolution of productivity between foreign and domestic firms, even 
after controlling for firm type. Whether an increase, status quo or 
decrease of productivity was reported did not depend on having 
received foreign investment or not. Note that we inquired about the 
evolution of the productivity. It might well be that the differences 
occur especially in the levels with foreign firms having a higher 
productivity than domestic firms. We found weak evidence that 
foreign firms have indeed higher productivity levels, especially 
amoung the privatised enterprises.  
 
Investigating entrepreneurial characteristics we found that almost one 
third of the FDI-firm’s entrepreneurs had previously worked in a 
foreign company. They also attached a high ranking to self-study as a 
source of learning for the operation of their enterprise. FDI-firms 
tended to have a more sophisticated competition strategy on the 
output market as well. This sheds new microeconomic evidence on 
the relation between human (entrepreneurial) capital and FDI. While it 
is often argued that FDI brings additional know-how into the domestic 
company, these results suggest that there has to be a minimum 
entrepreneurial know-how already in place in order to attract FDI as 
argued before by Borensztein et al (1995). The entrepreneur has to be 
acquainted with the foreign (Western) enterprise culture and ways of 
operation. This suggests that part of the perceived better 
entrepreneurial know-how and management ideas in foreign owned 
firms were already present before any foreign investment was 
received. However it seems to be equally important once the foreign 
investment is made that the domestic entrepreneur who is in charge of 
  24the venture keeps up to date and increases his entrepreneurial human 
capital.  
 
The above mentioned findings indicate an important positive spill-
over benefit of foreign investment operating through the managerial 
labour market. If being exposed to the enterprise culture and practices 
of a foreign firm improves the probability of obtaining FDI when one 
starts his/her own firm, FDI might proliferate the attraction of further 
FDI and consequently disperse greatly needed management practices 
in the sector or even in the country.  
 
Quite in contrast to the perceived positive effects of FDI both on the 
firm itself and through the spill-overs, a number of striking difficulties 
still remain in the operational (macro) environment. Half of the 
foreign firms indicated that their contacts with the authorities were the 
most problematic area of entrepreneurship. This is consistent with 
evidence from other studies that highlight the frequent changes in the 
legislation and the unclear formulation of the relevant laws (see for 
example OECD, 1997). Another problem field is the immaturity of the 
capital markets. Although FDI meets the need for long term 
investment capital, still 40 % of the foreign firms cited finding capital 
as the most difficult part of entrepreneurial endeavour. In order not to 
lose the perceived benefits of foreign investment both countries 
should take care of the quality of the relevant laws and regulations, 
both in terms of formulation and stability over time. Continued efforts 
to develop the capital market is another, yet long-term, goal to be 
aimed at.  
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1.  Which means before the outbreak of the Russian debt crisis. 
Anecdotal evidence suggest that the Russian crisis flawed the 
interest of potential foreign investor seriously, yet that the ones 
who were present continued to operate as planned. 
 
2.  For an overview of FDI in the former Soviet Union and the 
Russian regions see Brock (1998) and Meyer and Pind (1998). 
 
3.  Source: Ministry of Statistics, Ukraine. The data for Kiev 
comprise FDI for Kiev city plus FDI for the remainder of Kiev 
Oblast.  
 
4.  We are aware that this definition is different from the definition 
used by the United Nations and the IMF who introduce a 
minimum threshold of 10% (see e.g. Sheehy, 1992, p.2). We did 
not introduce a minimum value because we wanted to investigate 
all potential effects of foreign investment and not only the aspect 
of firm control. However, there were only two firms where the 
foreign investor owned less than 10% of the assets. 
 
5.  It has to be noted that no firms operating in the primary sector 
were surveyed. This explains the difference with findings from 
other studies that FDI in Russia is strongly linked with the energy 
sectors; see for example EBRD (1998) and Meyer and Pind 
(1999). 
 
6.  Note that the average share of regular receivables from the state 
offices is for both types of firms markedly lower than for other 
categories of debtors. This classifies the state as a dubious client.  
 
7.  Answers with the value 0 for “not applicable” were excluded 
because this would bias the results.  
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Note: The data on employment are those for the year 1996.  Source: own calculations. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of the sampled firms with FDI 
 
  Ukraine  Russia  Total 
Number of FDI-firms  26  8  34 
Average employment in 1996   187  731  306 
Average share of FDI  41%  63%  47% 
Average share of foreign investor  39%  46%  41% 
  27in  the start-up capital   
  28Table 3: Firms with foreign investment according to firm type (% distribution) 
 
Type  Ukraine  Russia  Total 
   - De novo   62%  29%  55% 
   - Privatised  38%  71%  45% 
 
 
Table 4: FDI-firms by sector and country 
 
Branch  Ukraine  Russia  Total 
   - manufacturing   10  6  47% 
   - trade  6  0  17% 
   - services  2  1  9% 
   - trade + services  2  1  9% 
   - other   2  0  6% 
   - manufacturing + trade  1  0  3% 
   - manufacturing + services  1  0  3% 
   - manufacturing + trade + 
services 
1 1  6% 
 
 
  29Table 5: FDI-firms according to type of foreign investment 
FDI type  Number of FDI-firms
(1)  Average ownership 
share (%) 
Greenfield 4  67 
Joint venture, creating a new 
firm 
12 45 
Joint venture with existing firms   3  41 
Acquisition, majority stake  4  82 
Acquisition, minority stake  10  25 
(1) For one firm the type of FDI could not be determined.   
Note that for all greenfield investments the foreign investor provided 100% of the start-up 
capital.  Yet in two cases the share of the foreign owner at the moment of the interview was 
substantially less, but still a majority share. 
Table 6: The proportion of firms that experienced financial difficulties in 1996 and 1997 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 











Note:  P-values lower or equal than 0.05 are marked with ** meaning that FDI-firms are 
significantly different from non FDI-firms at the 5% level.  P-values between 0.10 and 0.05 
are marked with *.  Standard errors are between brackets.  
 
  30Table 7: The average share of regular liabilities by type of creditor 
  Non FDI-firms FDI-firms  p-value 
% of regular liabilities paid 






% of regular liabilities paid 






% of regular liabilities paid 






% of regular liabilities paid 







Table 8: The average share of regular receivables by type of debtor 
  Non FDI-firms FDI-firms  p-value 
% regular receivables  
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Table 9: The average period in number of days of delayed payments 
  Non FDI-firms FDI-firms  p-value 
Average delay in payments 
from customers in number 








  31Table 10: Reasons for the accumulation of overdue liabilities (1=most important/9=least 
important) 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 

















Table 11: Ranking of the liabilities according to payment priority (1=most urgent 
payment, 4=least urgent payment) 
Creditor  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 























  32Table 12: The average share of total sales on the foreign market for FDI and non-FDI 
firms 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 



















Table 13: Geographical sales orientation of FDI and non-FDI firms (Percentage of firms 
within each group that sells the majority of its product and services on a certain 
market.)  


































  33Table 14: Investment activity in FDI and non-FDI firms by firm type 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 














Table 15: The average number of people involved with R&D in FDI and non-FDI firms 
by firm type 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 












Table 16: The proportion of firms that introduced new products or services in the 
period 1994-1997 for FDI and non-FDI firms by firm type 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 












  34Table 17: Importance of marketing mix (1=most important/ 9=least important) 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 
After sales support  5.05  
(0.13) 
 4.07  
(0.42) 
0.04* 











  35Table 18: Average years of private management experience and age of the 
entrepreneurs in FDI and non-FDI firms 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 
















Table 19: Proportion of firms where the management had experience in a foreign firm 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 
Respondent worked in a 






Other members of the 
management team worked 












  36Table 20: Sources of entrepreneurial learning in FDI and non-FDI firms.  Average rank 
by source (1=most important / 8=least important). 
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Note: answers with value 0 for “not applicable” were excluded. 
 
  37Table 21: Proportion of firms that consider a particular management objective as most 
important in FDI and non-FDI firms 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 























































  38Table 22: Proportion of FDI and non-FDI firms that consider a particular area of 
entrepreneurship as most difficult 
  Non FDI-firms  FDI-firms  p-value 
Pursue other people of the 
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